Sec. 821. Sense of Congress on the desired characteristics for the weapon systems acquisition system
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Congress makes the following findings: Despite significant and repeated attempts at acquisition reform, the Department of Defense still experiences case after case of expensive weapon system acquisition failures. The Department of Defense has a track record of too many cancellations, schedule slippages, cost over-runs, and failures to deliver timely solutions to the requirements of the Armed Forces. This situation is unacceptable. For example, according to the Final Report of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, between 1996 and 2010, the Army expended approximately $1 billion to $3 billion annually on two dozen programs that were eventually cancelled.
No military service and no type of weapon acquisition has been immune. Despite detailed weapon acquisition processes and procedures, there is only limited discipline in starting programs. Many programs begin without a solid foundation. They have too many requirements deemed critical , which are driven by too many organizations and individuals. Approved requirements are often set with only a limited understanding of the technical feasibility of achieving them. The resulting compromises of good program management and engineering judgment that allow the programs to proceed are the spackle of the acquisition system that covers up the risks and enables the system to operate.
As these weapon systems proceed into engineering and manufacturing development, they often encounter development problems leading to cost growth, schedule delay, and performance reductions. Industry and Government officials frequently respond by taking additional development risks to resolve basic performance issues by reducing the time to analyze and assess development results, overlapping key development efforts, and reducing testing. The Department of Defense and Congress disrupt the planned funding of stable programs to find resources for troubled programs or to fund across-the-board spending cuts.
Funding instability is the inevitable price that programs pay for survival because funding disruptions actually keep more programs alive. Finally, these weapons are often rushed into production only to encounter production problems, and are fielded with many unknowns or deficiencies leading to significantly reduced quantities and force structure reductions. The warfighter faces the challenge of operating weapons with poor reliability, high maintenance demands, reduced performance, and many capability shortfalls.
It is the sense of Congress that, in accordance with the tenets described in section 800, to improve weapon system acquisitions, the Department of Defense, Congress, and industry should develop an acquisition system characterized by highly disciplined program initiation coupled with agile program execution and balanced oversight, as described in paragraphs (2), (3), and (4). An acquisition system characterized by highly disciplined program initiation means that programs do not begin engineering development until firm requirements are matched to a flexible acquisition strategy structured to develop militarily useful capability that can be delivered in a relevant period of time with available technologies, funding, and management capacity.
Such a highly disciplined program initiation includes— a workforce with smart requirements setters and expert buyers, with the knowledge, skills, and experience to successfully plan for and execute highly complex acquisitions; requirements that are well-defined, technically feasible, and affordable; acquisition strategies that are designed to minimize time to market of militarily useful capability, with the program concerned being structured so that— lower-risk, technically mature capabilities are matched to delivering capability to the warfighter in the near term, while remaining requirements are aligned and resources are programmed to support integration into later increments to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces; capabilities are approved for an increment only when their developmental risks have been appropriately reduced; and increments are planned to complete engineering and manufacturing development in a reasonable period of time; a science and technology development enterprise that is responsive to the acquisition process before engineering and manufacturing development begins, and sufficiently resourced to reduce risks and enable programs to make smart decisions without losing critical funds; and redtape reduction in order to free up program and Department officials to focus on their mission of defining an executable program and understanding and addressing risks.
An acquisition system characterized by agile program execution means a system in which acquisition speed and flexibility to make trade-offs are balanced with the need to achieve desired technical performance. Such agile program execution includes— program managers and program officials who are expert buyers and negotiators who anticipate problems, negotiate solutions, and are empowered to manage; a preference for fixed price contracting where appropriate for the size and complexity of the work and for the nature and scope of the capabilities being developed; program managers who avoid increasing program risk by resisting the addition of new requirements or the reduction of developmental activities; empowering program managers and senior decisionmakers to make decisions easily in order to move forward with capabilities that mature quickly, cancel those that encounter greater difficulties than expected, and trade-off or reduce requirements to maintain cost and schedule; enabling program managers to focus on overcoming execution challenges and delivering success rather than concentrating on compliance with reporting, certifications, and other redtape; and senior decisionmakers who have knowledge of demonstrated performance as programs proceed through development, with robust developmental testing occurring before committing to production for operational use as a basis for decision making.
An acquisition system characterized by balanced oversight means that the focus is on ensuring discipline initiating programs and that appropriate adjustments are made during development, so that programs have the best chance to succeed. Such balanced oversight includes— involvement by decisionmakers early to ensure that an understanding of trade-offs, risks, and needs are considered, resourced, and validated, and that agreement is reached between the executive and legislative branches; acceptance by decisionmakers that complex weapon system developments are inherently risky and require expertise and flexibility to manage effectively; conscious decisions by decisionmakers regarding where to accept risk, while ensuring that risk mitigation plans are resourced (with time, funding, alternatives, and competent government and contractor officials); measuring and monitoring by decisionmakers of the right factors, such as technology maturation progress and systems engineering during risk reduction, development cost growth during engineering and manufacturing development, and reliability growth during system demonstration; work by Congress and the Department of Defense, once a program has begun, to resolve issues by considering trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance necessary to best support the warfighter; and congressional understanding of risks and efforts to mitigate such risks even if they are through non-traditional means or other technological advances.