Sec. 2. Findings
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Congress finds the following: Employers have an obligation to ensure a safe and healthy work environment for all employees. To help fulfill that obligation, Congress must conduct oversight of the executive agencies responsible for enforcing workplace safety laws and must revise and update Federal laws when necessary to protect the safety and health of the workforce of the United States. In response to several mining tragedies in early 2006, Congress quickly passed the most sweeping changes to mine safety laws in 30 years.
The Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 ( Public Law 109–236 , 120 Stat. 493), also known as the MINER Act , was signed into law on June 15, 2006. As a result of the MINER Act— coal miners are entitled to at least 2 hours of readily accessible oxygen supplies for use in emergencies and additional oxygen supplies every 30 minutes along escape routes; mines are required to implement emergency response plans and have 2 rescue teams located within one hour from the mine; mine operators are subjected to penalties for failing to quickly notify the Mine Safety and Health Administration about accidents; and a new grant program was created to provide mine safety training.
Although the MINER Act made significant improvements to mine rescue capabilities, Congress was again reminded of the need to continually improve and vigorously enforce our Federal mine safety laws when, on April 5, 2010, an explosion ripped through the Upper Big Branch Mine in Montcoal, West Virginia, killing 29 brave West Virginia coal miners and seriously injuring another. This was the worst coal mining disaster in the United States in nearly 40 years. We must never forget those who have been impacted by this tragedy—family members, friends, coworkers, loved ones, and most importantly, the individuals who perished in the Upper Big Branch explosion:
Carl Pee Wee Acord, Jason Matthew Atkins, Christopher Lee Bell, Sr., Gregory Steven Brock, Kenneth A. Chapman, Sr., Robert Eugene Clark, Cory Davis, Charles Timothy Davis, Michael Lee Elswick, William Ildon Griffith, Steven J. Smiley Harrah, Edward Dean Jones, Richard Keith Lane, William Roosevelt Lynch, Joe Marcum, Ronald Lee Maynor, Nicolas D. McCroskey, James Eddie Mooney, Adam K. Morgan, Rex Lane Mullins, Joshua Scott Napper, Howard Boone Payne, Jr., Dillard Earl Dewey Persinger, Joel R.
Jody Price, Gary Wayne Quarles, Deward Allan Scott, Grover Dale Skeens, Benny Ray Willingham, and Ricky L. Workman. Another miner, James Woods, was seriously injured in the explosion and a second survivor, Tim Blake, has been credited with heroically attempting to save the lives of his fellow miners by applying emergency breathing devices to them while they were unconscious. Five Federal, State, and independent entities have conducted investigations into the Upper Big Branch disaster.
Together, these reports conclude that the Upper Big Branch disaster was a preventable explosion caused by a failure of the operator to follow known safety standards, including those that are intended to prevent large-scale explosions. The United States Attorney for the Southern District of West Virginia has launched a criminal investigation into the Upper Big Branch disaster, which to date has resulted in the conviction of, or guilty pleas from, 4 employees or former employees of the Upper Big Branch mine.
In the 2 years following the Upper Big Branch disaster, Congress has held a total of 9 hearings on the disaster and on mine safety generally. Congress enacted, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( Public Law 111–203 , 124 Stat. 1376), an amendment requiring publicly traded mining companies to disclose serious safety violations to shareholders, the public, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Congress appropriated $22,000,000 through the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 ( Public Law 111–212 ) to reduce the backlog of appeals at the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, investigate the Upper Big Branch disaster, and purchase emergency response equipment.
During the year that this funding was available, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission was able to hire 6 additional judges and support staff and, along with the Department of Labor, was able to dispose of 11,643 cases, including 6,924 cases that had been specifically targeted for backlog reduction. In September 2010, the Mine Safety and Health Administration issued an emergency temporary standard that strengthened rock dusting requirements to reduce the likelihood and severity of explosions in underground mines.
In June 2011, the agency issued final regulations requiring mine operators to maintain incombustible content of combined dust of at least 80 percent in underground mines. Since April 2010, the Mine Safety and Health Administration has increased its enforcement by implementing impact inspections that target violations at unsafe mines with poor compliance history or specific safety concerns. As of March 2013, the Administration had conducted 579 impact inspections, resulting in 10,036 citations, 946 orders, and 43 safeguards.
The Mine Safety and Health Administration has also— revised the screening criteria for placing mines onto pattern of violations status under section 104(e) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (30 U.S.C. 814(e)), which subjects unsafe mines to increased enforcement and oversight; created a new online tool to allow operators, miners, and the public to monitor whether a mine could be subject to a pattern of violations; and finalized new regulations that will eliminate regulatory loopholes that have allowed unsafe mines to avoid being placed onto pattern of violations status altogether.
In April 2011, for the first time in history since the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 ( 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq. ) was enacted, the Mine Safety and Health Administration placed 2 mines onto pattern of violations status, and as of November 2012, had issued 98 letters notifying mines that they faced a potential pattern of violations, which is the regulatory precursor to being placed onto pattern of violations status. The entities charged with investigating the Upper Big Branch disaster have made several recommendations to improve the safety of miners that can only be accomplished through the legislative process.
At this time, Congress has not passed comprehensive mine safety legislation that is critical to improving the long-term structure of mine safety efforts and providing the maximum level of protection for our Nation’s miners and their families.
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- Pub. L. 109-236
- 120 Stat. 493
- Pub. L. 111-203
- 124 Stat. 1376
- Pub. L. 111-212
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Sec. 2
Findings
Pub. L.Pub. L. 109-236
Stat.120 Stat. 493
Pub. L.Pub. L. 111-203
Stat.124 Stat. 1376
Pub. L.Pub. L. 111-212
Cites 7Cited by 0 across 0 sources