Sec. 1055. Sense of congress on compliance with nuclear arms control agreements
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/bill/113/hr/1960/rh/section-1055·A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
Congress finds the following: President Obama stated in Prague in April 2009 that Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. . President Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 stated, it is not enough to detect non-compliance; violators must know that they will face consequences when they are caught. . The July 2010 Verifiability Assessment released by the Department of State on the New START Treaty stated, The costs and risks of Russian cheating or breakout, on the other hand, would likely be very significant.
In addition to the financial and international political costs of such an action, any Russian leader considering cheating or breakout from the New START Treaty would have to consider that the United States will retain the ability to upload large numbers of additional nuclear warheads on both bombers and missiles under the New START, which would provide the ability for a timely and very significant U.S. response. . Subsection
(a)of the Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty of the Senate, agreed to on December 22, 2010, listed conditions of the Senate to the ratification of the New START Treaty that are binding upon the President, including the condition under paragraph (1)(B) of such subsection that requires the President to take certain actions in response to actions by the Russian Federation that are in violation of or inconsistent with such treaty, including to seek on an urgent basis a meeting with the Russian Federation at the highest diplomatic level with the objective of bringing the Russian Federation into full compliance with its obligations under the New START Treaty . The Obama Administration demonstrated that violations of treaty obligations by other parties require corresponding action by the United States when, on November 22, 2011, the Department of State announced that the United States would cease carrying out certain obligations under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE)Treaty with regard to Russia. This announcement in the CFE Treaty’s implementation group comes after the United States and NATO Allies have tried over the past 4 years to find a diplomatic solution following Russia’s decision in 2007 to cease implementation with respect to all other 29 CFE States. Since then, Russia has refused to accept inspections and ceased to provide information to other CFE Treaty parties on its military forces as required by the Treaty. . On October 17, 2012, the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives wrote a classified letter to the President stating their concerns about a major arms control violation by the Russian Federation. The Chairmen followed up their classified letter with unclassified letters on February 14 and April 12, 2013—in their latest letter, the Chairmen stated that they expect the Administration to directly confront the Russian violations and circumventions of this and other treaties…[we] further ask, again, for your engagement in correcting this behavior. We also seek your commitment not to undertake further reductions to the U.S. nuclear deterrent or extended deterrent until this Russian behavior is corrected. We are in full agreement with your policy as you articulated it in Prague four years ago this month, . rules must be binding, Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. It is the sense of Congress that the President should consider not seeking to further limit or reduce the nuclear forces of the United States, including by negotiation, with a foreign country that remains in active noncompliance with existing nuclear arms obligations, such as the Russian Federation. If the President determines that a foreign country is not in compliance with its obligations under a nuclear arms control agreement, treaty, or commitment to which the United States is a party or in which the United States is a participating government, including the Missile Technology Control Regime, the President shall— immediately consult with Congress regarding the implications of such noncompliance for— the viability of such agreement, treaty, or commitment; and the national security interests of the United States and the allies of the United States; submit to Congress a plan concerning the diplomatic strategy of the President to engage such foreign country at the highest diplomatic level with the objective of bringing such country into full compliance with such obligations; and at the earliest date practicable following the submission of the plan under paragraph (2), submit to Congress a report detailing— whether adherence by the United States to such obligation remains in the national security interests of the United States or the allies of the United States; and how the United States will redress the effect of such noncompliance to the national security interests of the United States or such allies.