Sec. 1233. Sense of Congress on the defense of the Arabian Gulf
612 words·~3 min read·
/bill/113/hr/1960/eh/section-1233·A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
Congress finds the following: In response to U.S. Central Command requirements, the United States Navy has maintained, on average, more than one aircraft carrier in the Arabian Gulf for more than five years. In February 2013, the senior leadership of the Department of Defense elected to reduce the number of aircraft carriers deployed to the Arabian Gulf in light of budget constraints and limitation of the overall carrier force structure to support the two aircraft carrier requirement.
In reference to the decision to indefinitely delay the deployment of the USS Harry Truman, CVN 75, and the USS Gettysburg, its cruiser escort, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Martin Dempsey stated, We’re trying to stretch our readiness out by keeping this particular carrier in homeport in our global response force, so if something happens elsewhere in the world, we can respond to it. Had we deployed it and . consumed that readiness, we could have created a situation where downstream we wouldn’t have a carrier present in certain parts of the world at all.
Highlighting the risks of having only one aircraft carrier in the region and relying on land-based aircraft, General Dempsey stated, When you have carrier-based aircraft, you have complete autonomy and control over when you use them. When you use land-based aircraft, you often have to have host-nation permission to use them. . Addressing the perception of the United States commitment to the region, General James Mattis, Commander of U.S. Central Command, testified in March 2013, Perhaps the greatest risk to U.S. interests in the region is a perceived lack of an enduring U.S. commitment to collective interests and the security of our regional partners. .
He went on to testify that, The drawdown of our forces can be misinterpreted as a lack of attention, a lack of commitment to the region. . It is the sense of Congress that— maintaining only one aircraft carrier battle group in the Arabian Gulf constrains United States’ options and could put at risk the ability to have diversified platforms from which to defend the Arabian Gulf and, if necessary, to conduct military operations to prevent Iran from threatening the United States, United States allies, or Iran’s neighbors with nuclear weapons; it is in the interests of the United States to maintain both land-based and sea-based capabilities in the region to project force; land-based locations in the region could restrict United States military options and critically impact the operational capability if required to conduct a defense of the Arabian Gulf because the United States has not finalized bilateral security agreements with key Gulf Cooperation Council countries; as a result of these and other critical limitations associated with maintaining one aircraft carrier battle group in the Arabian Gulf, United States military commanders have expressed concerns about the operational constraints, the increasing uncertainty among United States allies, and the emboldening of potential adversaries such as Iran; regarding the ability of the United States Navy to maintain a two aircraft carrier presence in the Arabian Gulf, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, stated, We need 11 carriers to do the job.
That’s been pretty clearly written, and that’s underwritten in our defense strategic guidance. . the United States should construct and sufficiently sustain a fleet of at least eleven aircraft carriers and associated battle force ships in order to meet current and future requirements and to support at least a two aircraft carrier battle group presence in the Arabian Gulf, in addition to meeting other operational requirements; and the United States should finalize bilateral agreements with key Gulf Cooperation Council countries that support the Defense of the Arabian Gulf requirements, at the earliest possible date.