Sec. 913. Study on feasibility and advisability of establishing a Joint Capabilities and Programming Board
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The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a Joint Capabilities and Programming Board (in this section referred to as the Board ) within the Department of Defense to serve as a consolidated forum for addressing joint military capabilities and program budgeting for investments. The study required by subsection
(a)shall assess and provide recommendations on the following elements for the proposed Board: The potential for the Board to act as the primary joint forum for— reviewing and recommending actions on joint military capabilities spanning multiple components of the Department of Defense to address priority capability needs; and evaluating and recommending actions on investment portfolio evaluation and budgeting matters to prioritize joint military capabilities and optimize lethality based on available resources. The feasibility of the Board being co-chaired by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation and the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, including the roles, authorities, and responsibilities of the co-chairpersons. The advisability of a Board composition that includes— core membership consisting of— the co-chairpersons; representatives from the Joint Requirements Oversight Council; representatives from the Office of the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; representatives from the Armed Forces and combatant commands to reflect military user perspectives; and representatives of portfolio acquisition executives or equivalent managers to reflect program execution perspectives; a flexible structure permitting the establishment of ad hoc or standing committees to address specific areas or issues, drawing from the core membership; separate staff directly accountable to each co-chairperson to assist in identifying, reviewing, coordinating, and analyzing matters brought before the Board; and mission engineering and integration analysis cells that evaluate the effectiveness of current and proposed value chains of the Department of Defense and inform the assessment of alternative courses of action for capability and resource investments. The potential structure for decision-making by the Board, including— maintaining autonomy for the Armed Forces and portfolio acquisition executives to make decisions and execute programs without requiring approval by or the submission of documentation to the Board; issuing recommendations by majority vote of members of the Board, to be forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense unless unanimously rejected by the co-chairpersons; and allowing the members or representatives of the Board to submit dissenting opinions alongside recommendations for consideration by the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Defense. The feasibility of operational procedures, including— issue identification processes prioritizing issues— nominated by members of the Board, the Armed Forces, the combatant commands, or portfolio acquisition executives; and addressing capability gaps, resource constraints, or programmatic challenges requiring joint or departmental action; and flexible quorum and voting procedures to ensure efficient decision-making and requiring participation from representatives of military users and program acquisition executives directly impacted by any recommendation. The provision of sufficient staff, directly accountable to the co-chairpersons, to support the Board’s operations and analysis of issues. The impact of the proposed Board on existing entities of the Department of Defense, including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Office of the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, including potential overlaps, redundancies, or synergies between the missions and responsibilities of those entities and the Board. The anticipated benefits of enhanced joint capability prioritization and resource allocation, including the ability to consolidate or remove existing processes and decision forums. Potential barriers to establishing the Board, including resource requirements and alignment with existing acquisition and budgeting processes. Not later than July 1, 2026, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the results of the study required by subsection (a). The report required by paragraph
(1)shall include— a comprehensive analysis of the feasibility and advisability of establishing the Board, addressing each element specified in subsection (b); if establishing the Board is deemed feasible and advisable— specific recommendations for the organizational structure, governance, voting mechanisms, quorum requirements, and operational procedures of the Board; and an estimation of the costs, resource requirements, and timeline for establishing and operating the Board; and any additional findings or recommendations to improve joint capability development, program budgeting, and resource allocation within the Department of Defense. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the establishment of a Joint Capabilities and Programming Board before the completion and review of the study required by subsection (a).