Sec. 402. Enhancing strategic competition at the Department of State
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It is the policy of the United States— to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development, military, informational, and technological realms that maximizes the United States strengths and increases the costs for the PRC of harming United States interests and the values of United States allies and partners; to lead a free, open, and secure international system characterized by freedom from coercion, rule of law, open markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commitment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, and good and transparent governance; to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and Europe, by pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared interests and values and bolster the confidence of partner countries that the United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and constant partner; to encourage and collaborate with United States allies and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values, free from coercion and external pressure; to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy competition in United States-China economic relations by— advancing policies that harden the United States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or trading practices and the coercion of United States businesses; and tightening United States laws and regulations as necessary to prevent the PRC’s attempts to harm United States economic competitiveness; to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth in emerging markets around the world, including through the use of United States Government tools that— support greater private sector investment and advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded in the rule of law; promote open markets; establish clear policy and regulatory frameworks; improve the management of key economic sectors; combat corruption; and foster and support greater collaboration with and among partner countries and the United States private sector to develop secure and sustainable infrastructure; to lead in the advancement of international rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and integrated markets; to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of United States companies and businesses in partner countries that seek fair competition; to ensure that the United States leads in the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum information science, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by— providing necessary investment and concrete incentives for the private sector and the United States Government to accelerate development of such technologies; modernizing export controls and investment screening regimes and associated policies and regulations; enhancing United States leadership in technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical technologies; reducing United States barriers and increasing incentives for collaboration with allies and partners on the research and co-development of critical technologies; collaborating with allies and partners to protect critical technologies by— crafting multilateral export control measures; building capacity for defense technology security; safeguarding chokepoints in supply chains; and ensuring diversification; and designing major defense capabilities for export to allies and partners; to collaborate with advanced democracies and other willing partners to promote ideals and principles that— advance a free and open international order; strengthen democratic institutions; protect and promote human rights; and uphold a free press and fact-based reporting; to develop comprehensive and holistic strategies and policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns; to demonstrate effective leadership at the United Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral organizations and defend the integrity of these organizations against co-optation by illiberal and authoritarian nations; to prioritize the defense of fundamental freedoms and human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC; to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral organizations, leveraging their significant and growing capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that sustains and strengthens a free and open order and addresses regional and global challenges to hold the Government of the PRC accountable for— violations and abuses of human rights; restrictions on religious practices; and undermining and abrogating treaties, other international agreements, and other international norms related to human rights; to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, repression, and other malign behavior to attain unfair economic advantages and to pressure other nations to defer to its political and strategic objectives; to maintain United States access to the Western Pacific, including by— increasing United States forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region; modernizing the United States military through investments in existing and new platforms, emerging technologies, critical in-theater force structure and enabling capabilities, joint operational concepts, and a diverse, operationally resilient and politically sustainable posture; and operating and conducting exercises with allies and partners— to mitigate the Peoples Liberation Army’s ability to project power and establish contested zones within the First and Second Island Chains; to diminish the ability of the People’s Liberation Army to coerce its neighbors; to maintain open sea and air lanes, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea; and to project power from the United States and its allies and partners to demonstrate the ability to conduct contested logistics; to deter the PRC from— coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including by developing more combat-credible forces that are integrated with allies and partners in contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to defeat any PRC theory of victory in the First or Second Island Chains of the Western Pacific and beyond, as called for in the 2018 National Defense Strategy; using grey-zone tactics below the level of armed conflict; or initiating armed conflict; to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military communication and improve de-escalation procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and military officials and other measures, in alignment with United States interests; and to cooperate with the PRC if interests align, including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the United Nations, as appropriate.
There is authorized to be established at the Department of State a Regional China Officer
(RCO)program to support regional posts and officers with reporting, information, and policy tools, and to enhance expertise related to strategic competition with the PRC. There is authorized to be appropriated $2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to the Department of State to expand the RCO program, including for— the placement of Regional China Officers at United States missions to the United Nations and United Nations affiliated organizations; the placement of additional Regional China Officers in Africa; the hiring of locally employed staff to support Regional China Officers serving abroad; and the establishment of full-time equivalent positions to assist in managing and facilitating the RCO program. There is authorized to be appropriated $50,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for each Regional China Officer to support programs and public diplomacy activities of the Regional China Officer. It is the sense of Congress that— the Office for China Coordination should employ at least one full-time equivalent Data Officer, who shall not be dual-hatted, focused on strategic competition with the PRC; and the Department should, to the extent possible within existing authorities, prioritize access for the Office for China Coordination to databases, commercial software, and other data to support policy-making related to strategic competition with the PRC.