Sec. 3. Findings

983 words·~4 min read·/bill/118/s/5377/is/section-3

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Congress finds the following: Since the advent and proliferation of the internet, the Chinese Communist Party has viewed the global, cross-border, and open information environment the internet created as an existential threat to its legitimacy, its effective indoctrination and control of its citizens, and its authoritarian political system. Despite brief periods of increased openness in the internet ecosystem of the People's Republic of China during the early 2000s, the CCP has since expended billions of dollars to develop a digital information control regime (commonly known as the Great Firewall of China ) that is a wholescale substitution of the global internet with compelling, nearly universally used domestic platforms with built-in censorship and surveillance features as alternatives, which has fundamentally reshaped its population’s behavior.

Through this system in the PRC, the Great Firewall blocks foreign internet search providers, independent news and media websites, circumvention and secure messaging tools, and other content deemed undesirable by the CCP. The PRC also engages in meta-level censorship to obscure the possibility of circumvention and surveillance evasion by criminalizing VPNs, blocking discussion of anti-censorship methods, widespread app removal from app stores, and related techniques. Chinese internet users must contend with expansive repressive digital surveillance that often results in real-world consequences and leads to significant self-censorship.

Under the leadership of Chairman Xi Jinping, the CCP and government organs have prioritized— the censorship and surveillance of their citizens’ online behavior; and the indoctrination of the CCP’s— authoritarian worldview; anti-American and anti-West propaganda; and intent to undermine and redefine the United States-led global order. The PRC’s internet censorship regime systematically— amplifies the voices of nationalistic internet users; silences the voices of moderate or dissenting voices; suppresses information that threatens the credibility of the CCP, including reports of corruption and of unexplained wealth held by CCP and People’s Liberation Army officials and their families; and creates an echo chamber on the PRC domestic internet that makes it challenging for international observers to decipher— the prevailing beliefs, values, and perspectives of different segments of PRC society; and their views on the domestic and foreign policies of the PRC government.

Concurrent with the increased sophistication and refinement of the PRC’s censored and restricted information space, the CCP has expended billions of dollars to build an asymmetric advantage by reengineering its population’s online norms concurrent with— exploiting the open and uncensored online information environment in the United States and many countries globally to advance its pro-CCP and anti-United States propaganda and disinformation; and highly restricting the United States online and public diplomacy activities in the PRC.

The United States Ambassador to China, Nicholas Burns, recently stated that the PRC’s Ministry of State Security has interrupted and effectively cancelled 61 public in-person and online events organized by the United States mission in China since November 2023. Despite a comprehensive censorship and surveillance regime, the relentless indoctrination by CCP and PRC government organs, and the highly coordinated, systematized, and repressive structure of the PRC censorship and propaganda apparatus, PRC citizens have begun to demonstrate— a lack of confidence and satisfaction in their government’s policies, conduct, and the information available to them within the PRC’s censored and restrictive online information space; and a growing willingness to express dissent online, seek alternative sources of information and engagement, and call for greater economic and political freedoms.

In a recent Stanford University study, researchers discovered that PRC university students who were exposed to foreign news and independent content changed their knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors suggesting that demand for uncensored information can persist and may generate pressure on the PRC censorship apparatus. In 2021, during a period when the Clubhouse application was briefly uncensored in the People’s Republic of China, downloads and engagement on Clubhouse rapidly increased and provided an opportunity for PRC internet users to openly discuss sensitive topics, including— the reeducation camps in Xinjiang; the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre; and the future of Taiwan.

One Clubhouse user penned a hashtag, which was viewed more than 50,000,000 times, calling the discussions the Renaissance of China . In 2022, during the multi-city White Paper protests in defiance of the Government of the PRC’s zero-COVID–19 policy, internet users in the PRC expressed solidarity and organized the protests through a variety of online platforms. Information technology news outlet Techopedia released a report and data indicating that, despite being largely blocked and criminalized, the usage of VPNs in the PRC doubled during 2023.

In February 2024, after the United States Embassy in Beijing posted information on China’s popular Weibo social media platform discussing scientists’ use of satellite data to track and monitor the movement of giraffes, the platform was inundated with comments from PRC internet users lamenting the state of the PRC economy and recent turmoil in its stock, bond, and real estate markets, with many users expressing a desire for help from the United States. The demand among PRC citizens for independent and alternative sources of information is growing, while the level of United States Government funding to disseminate circumvention tools to PRC citizens so they can access independent information has remained at consistently low levels, especially compared to the billions of renminbi (Chinese yuan) the PRC is spending to censor and monitor its internet ecosystem.

Publicly-funded VPNs supported through the Open Technology Fund are used by millions of monthly active users in China and have proven to be resilient. Traditional circumvention tools, such as VPNs, are necessary but are not sufficient to address the unique challenge of China’s socio-technological information control system. Increasing access to independent information for PRC citizens will aid broader United States efforts— to engage PRC citizens; to provide credible and reliable alternative sources of information for PRC citizens regarding events occurring within the PRC and globally; to promote a balanced understanding of the United States among PRC citizens; and to support PRC citizens in their efforts to advance their individual freedoms and human rights and hold their government accountable.