Sec. 101. Findings; sense of Congress
444 words·~2 min read·
/bill/118/s/3334/is/section-101A research copy — for the controlling text, always check the official state or federal source. Not legal advice.
Congress makes the following findings: The Islamic Republic of Iran has the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, which Iran uses to threaten forces of the United States and partners of the United States in the region. Iran is progressing toward developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (commonly referred to an ICBM ) capability. In 2023, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that Iran’s progress on its space-launch vehicles shortens the time needed for Iran to produce an ICBM since space-launch vehicles and ICBMs use similar technologies.
Iran continues to rely on illicit foreign procurement to support its long-range missile aspirations. For example, Iran recently tried to purchase from the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China ammonium perchlorate, which is the main ingredient in solid propellants to power missiles. Iran relies at least in part on networks in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China to procure dual-use materials and equipment for its longer-range ballistic missile program.
North Korea historically has played a role in supporting longer-range Iranian ballistic missile capabilities. Specifically, North Korea provided the Nodong-A to Iran in the 1990s, which Iran used to develop both its first nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missile and liquid propellant engines for its space-launch vehicles. While the Iran Space Agency, a government organization subject to sanctions, develops space capabilities for Iran’s ministry of defense as well as the communications sector, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (commonly referred to as the IRGC–AF ) runs a parallel space program employing solid-propellant motors, which if used in ICBM technology, would enable launches with little warning.
Iran continues work on larger diameter solid-propellant motors, like the Rafa’e, and is now reportedly in the possession of an all-solid-propellant space-launch vehicle called the Qaem–100. The Qaem–100 was reportedly tested twice, once in November 2022 and again in March 2023. The IRGC–AF last successfully launched a satellite into orbit in September 2023 using its Qased rocket, fueled by both liquid- and solid-fueled stages. Iran’s development, production, and transfer of space-launch vehicle and ballistic missile technology violated Annex B of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which enshrined certain restrictions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Those restrictions expired on October 18, 2023. It is the sense of Congress that— Iran’s space program continues to function as a cover for Iran's quest for an ICBM; the possession by Iran of an ICBM would pose a direct threat to the United States homeland and partners of the United States in Europe; and the United States should work to deny Iran the ability to hold the United States homeland or European partners of the United States at risk with an ICBM.