Sec. 4. Strategy to counter role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions with respect to Iran
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Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a written strategy, and provide to those committees an accompanying briefing, on the role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products that includes an assessment of options— to strengthen the enforcement of such sanctions; and to expand sanctions designations targeting the involvement of the People's Republic of China in the production, transportation, storage, refining, and sale of Iranian-origin petroleum products.
The strategy required by subsection
(a)shall include— a description of the use of sanctions in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act to target individuals and entities of the People's Republic of China that are directly or indirectly associated with smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products; an assessment of— the People's Republic of China’s petroleum refining capabilities; which of the People's Republic of China's refineries are at high risk of processing Iranian-origin petroleum products and why; Iranian-owned entities operating in the People's Republic of China and involved in petroleum refining supply chains; the People's Republic of China’s role in global petroleum refining supply chains; how the People's Republic of China leverages its role in global petroleum supply chains to achieve political objectives; the People's Republic of China’s petroleum importing and exporting partners; what percent of the People's Republic of China’s energy consumption is linked to illegally imported Iranian-origin petroleum products; the amount of money the People's Republic of China saves by illegally importing discounted Iranian-origin petroleum products rather than paying market price; what level of influence the Chinese Communist Party holds over non-state, semi-independent teapot refineries; and the challenges limiting the ability of the United States to impose or enforce sanctions with respect to such refineries, including— Lawen Namu Petroleum Trading Company; Qihang Energy; and Shangang Guomao; a detailed plan for— monitoring the maritime domain for smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products in violation of sanctions imposed by the United States, including through— automatic identification system monitoring; satellite imagery; vessel comparison and tanker classification; receiving tips from operators; and creating a database of reported potential sanctions violations; identifying the individuals, entities, and vessels responsible for such smuggling, including— vessels— operated by the National Iranian Tanker Company or any other Chinese or Iranian entity subject to sanctions imposed by the United States; transporting petrochemicals subject to sanctions; conducting ship-to-ship transfers of such petrochemicals; with deactivated automatic identification systems; or that engage in flag hopping by changing national registries; individuals or entities— storing petrochemicals subject to sanctions; or refining or otherwise processing such petrochemicals; and through the use of port entry and docking permission of vessels subject to sanctions; assessing the viability of seizing targets identified as belonging to entities smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products in violation of sanctions imposed by the United States, including— location; origin and destination; seaworthiness; and asset value; seizing, prosecuting, and, if appropriate, liquidating viable targets identified as belonging to entities involved in such smuggling; deterring individuals and entities from violating sanctions by educating and engaging— insurance providers; parent companies; and vessel operators; collaborating with allies and partners of the United States engaged in the Arabian Peninsula, including through standing or new maritime task forces, to build sanctions enforcement capacity through assistance and training to defense and law enforcement services; and using public communications and global diplomatic engagements to highlight the role of petroleum product smuggling in supporting Iran’s human rights abuses and destabilizing terrorism activities; and an assessment of— the total number of vessels smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products; the total number of vessels smuggling such petroleum products destined for the People's Republic of China; the number of vessels smuggling such petroleum products specifically from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; the most strategic locations for intercepting smuggled Iranian-origin petroleum products destined for the People's Republic of China; interference from the People's Republic of China in attempts by the United States to investigate or enforce sanctions on Iranian petroleum product exports; the effectiveness of the use of sanctions with respect to insurers of entities that own or operate vessels involved in smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products; the distinction between the total number of suspected violations of sanctions related to smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products and the number of vessels legally viable to seize and prosecute in litigation, if any, and an accompanying explanation for each; the personnel and resources needed to enforce sanctions with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products; and the impact of smuggled Iranian-origin petroleum products on global energy markets. The strategy required by subsection
(a)shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified index.