Sec. 3. Findings
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Congress makes the following findings: The United States has entered into a period of intense strategic rivalry with China that includes military competition on a scale unseen in generations. The perpetuation of a military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific favorable to the United States and its allies and partners can no longer be assumed as China continues to invest massive resources in its military. China has undertaken a nuclear breakout, fields the world’s largest navy, and is fielding a fully modernized air force.
North Korea remains an urgent and gathering threat as it fields an increasingly diverse and advanced nuclear and missile force backed by a massive conventional army. Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons capability while fomenting unrest in the Middle East and beyond. While China remains the pacing threat for the United States, Russia’s unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine makes clear that multiple dissatisfied powers are coalescing into an informal bloc designed to challenge the existing United States-led global order.
United States efforts to help Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression and strengthen Taiwan’s ability to resist the coercion of the Chinese Communist Party have exposed the production constraints inherent in the United States defense industrial base. The capacity limitations of the United States defense industrial base require urgent remedy to include a renewed examination of burden sharing roles with United States allies. To meet this comprehensive challenge to American interests, we must act at the speed of relevance to expand the resilience and capacity of our defense industrial base.
United States allies should be full partners in this effort and the AUKUS partnership is a necessary first step to share the responsibility of perpetuating the existing rules-based order. The security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (referred to as the AUKUS partnership ) is meant to bolster capability of the United States and allies in the Indo-Pacific and beyond through technology sharing, cooperation, and defense exports. The AUKUS partnership’s focus on conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines and advanced capabilities, known respectively as Pillars One and Two, rightly centers on cooperation at the highest end of security and geostrategic competition.
Pillar One, while bold, is complex, highly contingent and unlikely to produce additive submarine capability in the Indo-Pacific until the 2030s. The Pillar One initiative will rely on the expertise developed by the United States and United Kingdom in operating their submarine fleets to bring an Australian capability into service at the earliest achievable date. Pillar Two proposes that AUKUS partners will also deepen cooperation and integration on advanced defense technologies to include hypersonic missiles, space technology, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and additional undersea capabilities.
Pillar Two, if executed with the vision described by the three allies in the AUKUS announcement of September 2021, offers the potential to produce meaningful capability and increase industrial capacity during the current decade. Pillar Two can also expand and build resilience across the supply chain of the AUKUS partners. However, certain statutory components of the United States export control and regulatory system are overly cumbersome for industries in the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, delaying and complicating the United States from achieving national security objectives at the speed of relevance.
Australia and the United Kingdom have legal, regulatory, and technology control regimes that are sufficiently comparable to those of the United States. United States technology controls and export licensing decisions must balance the relatively low risk of compromise that exists across all three AUKUS partners regulatory regimes against the requirements to respond at the speed of relevance to the rapid military advances made by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. In order to implement the AUKUS agreement and realize the value of increased cooperation between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, the United States must ensure cooperation is fostered, not inhibited, by the United States regulatory system.
The United States export control system, encompassing both the International Traffic and Arms Regulations and the Export Administration Regulations, is largely based on a bilateral government-to-government relationship, is not optimized for a trilateral arrangement, and must reflect the new era of allied partnership continuing evolution of United States export control regulation. The Department of State, in concert with the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, and other relevant United States agencies, should clearly communicate to our AUKUS partners any United States requirements to address matters related to the technology security and export control measures of Australia and the United Kingdom.
Further, the Department of State, in concert with the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, and other relevant United States agencies, should work to reduce barriers to defense innovation, cooperation, trade, production, and sustainment with the governments and industry partners of the United Kingdom and Australia. These barriers include the overuse of no foreign nationals (NOFORN) and Controlled Unclassified Information
(CUI)determinations that inhibit collaboration among AUKUS partners in determining requirements, design, development, acquisition, testing, operation, and sustainment of capabilities designed to be interoperable. The successful implementation of the AUKUS partnership requires regulatory and licensing changes on the part of all AUKUS partner countries and the continued enhancement of the export control and technology security regimes of all three nations. If AUKUS realizes its potential, it will set a precedent and incentivize similar agreements with other close United States allies, which will be necessary if we are to prevail in the long-term competition with China, Russia and its partners.