Sec. 6503. Intelligence community working group for monitoring the economic and technological capabilities of the People’s Republic of China
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The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall establish a cross-intelligence community analytical working group (in this section referred to as the working group ) on the economic and technological capabilities of the People’s Republic of China. The working group shall monitor and analyze— the economic and technological capabilities of the People’s Republic of China; the extent to which those capabilities rely on exports, financing, or services from the United States and other foreign countries; the links of those capabilities to the military-industrial complex of the People’s Republic of China; and the threats those capabilities pose to the national security and values of the United States.
In this subsection, the term appropriate committees of Congress means— the congressional intelligence committees; the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Not less frequently than once each year, the working group shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of the economic and technological strategy, efforts, and progress of the People’s Republic of China to become the dominant military, technological, and economic power in the world and undermine the rules-based world order. Each assessment required by paragraph
(2)shall include the following: An unclassified overview of the major goals, strategies, and policies of the People’s Republic of China to control, shape, or develop self-sufficiency in key technologies and control related supply chains and ecosystems, including— efforts to acquire United States and other foreign technology and recruit foreign talent in technology sectors of the People’s Republic of China, including the extent to which those efforts relate to the military-industrial complex of the People’s Republic of China; efforts related to incentivizing offshoring of United States and foreign manufacturing to China, influencing global supply chains, and creating supply chain vulnerabilities for the United States, including China’s financing or potential financing in foreign countries to create monopolies in the processing and exporting of rare earth and other critical materials necessary for renewable energy, including cobalt, lithium, and nickel; related tools and market access restrictions or distortions imposed by the People’s Republic of China on foreign firms and laws and regulations of the People’s Republic of China that discriminate against United States and other foreign firms; and efforts of the People’s Republic of China to attract or restrict financing from the United States and other foreign countries to build self-sufficient national defense capabilities, an evaluation of the relative contribution of foreign financing to China's economic support for such capabilities, and the type of capital flows from the United States into China's national defense capabilities from the specific actions taken by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to attract or restrict financing to the outcome of such efforts for entities and persons of the People’s Republic of China. An unclassified assessment of the progress of the People’s Republic of China to achieve its goals, disaggregated by economic sector. An unclassified assessment of the impact of the transfer of capital, technology, data, talent, and technical expertise from the United States to China on the economic, technological, and military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China. An unclassified list of the top 200 businesses, academic and research institutions, or other entities of the People’s Republic of China that are— developing, producing, or exporting to other countries the technologies that are strategically important to the People’s Republic of China or supporting entities of the People’s Republic of China that are subject to sanctions imposed by the United States; supporting the military-civil fusion program or the military industrial complex of the People’s Republic of China; or otherwise supporting the goals and efforts of the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese government entities, including the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the People’s Liberation Army. An unclassified list of the top 100 development, infrastructure, or other strategic projects that the People’s Republic of China is financing abroad that— advance the technology goals and strategies of the Chinese Communist Party; or evade financial sanctions, export controls, or import restrictions imposed by the United States. An unclassified list of the top 100 businesses, research institutions, or other entities of the People’s Republic of China that are developing surveillance, smart cities, or related technologies that are— exported to other countries, undermining democracy worldwide; or provided to the security services of the People’s Republic of China, enabling them to commit severe human rights abuses in China. An unclassified list of the top 100 businesses or other entities of the People’s Republic of China that are— operating in the genocide zone in Xinjiang; or supporting the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, the Xinjiang Bureau of the Ministry of State Security, the People’s Armed Police, or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. A list of investment funds, public companies, or private or early-stage firms of the People’s Republic of China that have received more than $100,000,000 in capital flows from the United States during the 10-year period preceding the date on which the assessment is submitted. In preparing each assessment required by paragraph (2), the working group shall use open source documents in Chinese language and commercial databases. An assessment required by paragraph
(2)may be submitted in the format of a National Intelligence Estimate. Each assessment required by paragraph
(2)shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The unclassified portion of each assessment required by paragraph
(2)shall be published on the publicly accessible website of the Director of National Intelligence. Not less frequently than quarterly, the working group shall provide to Congress a classified briefing on the economic and technological goals, strategies, and progress of the People’s Republic of China, especially on the information that cannot be disclosed in the unclassified portion of an assessment required by subsection (c)(2). Each classified annex to an assessment required by subsection (c)(2) or corresponding briefing provided under subsection
(d)shall include an analysis of— the vulnerabilities of the People’s Republic of China, disaggregated by economic sector, industry, and entity; and the technological or supply chain chokepoints of the People’s Republic of China that provide leverage to the United States. This section shall cease to be effective on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.