Sec. 30223. Statement of policy
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It shall be the policy of the United States to— prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United States foreign policy, and prioritize resources for achieving United States political and military objectives in the region; exercise freedom of operations in the international waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific maritime domains, which are critical to the prosperity, stability, and security of the Indo-Pacific region; maintain forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including a rotational bomber presence, integrated missile defense capabilities, long-range precision fires, undersea warfare capabilities, and diversified and resilient basing and rotational presence, including support for pre-positioning strategies; strengthen and deepen the alliances and partnerships of the United States to build capacity and capabilities, increase multilateral partnerships, modernize communications architecture, address anti-access and area denial challenges, and increase joint exercises and security cooperation efforts; reaffirm the commitment and support of the United States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding United States policy regarding— Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, signed at Washington January 19, 1960;
Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington October 1, 1953; Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, signed at Washington August 30, 1951, including that, as the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article IV of our mutual defense treaty;
Article IV of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, done at San Francisco September 1, 1951; and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at Manila September 8, 1954, together with the Thanat-Rusk Communique of 1962; collaborate with United States treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral security and defense cooperation with other regional partners; ensure the continuity of operations by the United States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including, as appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, in order to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in international waters and airspace in accordance with established principles and practices of international law; sustain the Taiwan Relations Act ( Public Law 96–8 ; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq. ) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 as the foundations for United States-Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the fullest extent possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations of the United States and Taiwan, including cooperation to support the development of capable, ready, and modern forces necessary for the defense of Taiwan; enhance security partnerships with India, across Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the Indo-Pacific; deter acts of aggression or coercion by the PRC against United States and allies’ interests, especially along the First Island Chain and in the Western Pacific, by showing PRC leaders that the United States can and is willing to deny them the ability to achieve their objectives, including by— consistently demonstrating the political will of the United States to deepening existing treaty alliances and growing new partnerships as a durable, asymmetric, and unmatched strategic advantage to the PRC’s growing military capabilities and reach; maintaining a system of forward-deployed bases in the Indo-Pacific region as the most visible sign of United States resolve and commitment to the region, and as platforms to ensure United States operational readiness and advance interoperability with allies and partners; adopting a more dispersed force posture throughout the region, particularly the Western Pacific, and pursuing maximum access for United States mobile and relocatable launchers for long-range cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific region; fielding long-range, precision-strike networks to United States and allied forces, including ground-launched cruise missiles, undersea and naval capabilities, and integrated air and missile defense in the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, in order to deter and prevent PRC coercion and aggression, and to maximize the United States ability to operate; strengthening extended deterrence to ensure that escalation against key United States interests would be costly, risky, and self-defeating; and collaborating with allies and partners to accelerate their roles in more equitably sharing the burdens of mutual defense, including through the acquisition and fielding of advanced capabilities and training that will better enable them to repel PRC aggression or coercion; and maintain the capacity of the United States to impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial, reputational, and military costs on the PRC for acts of coercion or aggression, including to defend itself and its allies regardless of the point of origin of attacks against them.
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- Pub. L. 96-8
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